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RELATIVE NET UTILITY AND THE SAINT PETERSBURG
PARADOX
Daniel Muller and Tshilidzi Marwala
The famous Saint Petersburg Paradox (St. Petersburg Paradox) shows that the
theory of expected value does not capture the real-world economics of decision-
making problems. Over the years, many economic theories were developed to resolve
the paradox and explain gaps in the economic value theory in the evaluation of eco-
nomic decisions, the subjective utility of the expected outcomes, and risk aversion as
observed in the game of the St. Petersburg Paradox. In this paper, we use the con-
cept of the relative net utility to resolve the St. Petersburg Paradox. Because the net
utility concept is able to explain both behavioral economics and the St. Petersburg
Paradox, it is deemed to be a universal approach to handling utility. This paper shows
how the information content of the notion of net utility value allows us to capture a
broader context of the impact of a decision’s possible achievements. It discusses the
necessary conditions that the utility function has to conform to avoid the paradox.
Combining these necessary conditions allows us to define the theorem of indifference
in the evaluation of economic decisions and to present the role of the relative net
utility and net utility polarity in a value rational decision-making process.
Keywords: St Petersburg paradox, net utility, reference point, expected utility
theory, bounded utility.
1. INTRODUCTION
The St. Petersburg Paradox is a well-known problem in probability and de-
cision theory. The St. Petersburg Paradox shows that the theory of expected
value does not capture the real-world economics of decision-making problems.
The problem was formulated by Nicolas Bernoulli in 1713 and was introduced
by his cousin, Daniel Bernoulli Bernoulli (1738/1954), to the Imperial Academy
of Sciences in St. Petersburg as follows:
Peter tosses a coin and continues to do so until it lands on ”heads” when it comes to
the ground. He agrees to give Paul one ducat if he gets ”heads” on the very first throw,
two ducats if he gets it on the second, four if on the third, eight if on the fourth, and so
on. With each additional throw, the number of ducats he must pay is doubled. Suppose
we seek to determine the value of Paul’s expectation.
In the paper, “Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk”,
Bernoulli (1738/1954) suggests a solution to the paradox which is based on the
subjectivity of utility of the expected outcome of the game. The St. Peters-
burg Paradox is referred to by Samuelson (1977) as ”a dramatic and even over-
dramatic case”, and it illustrates that real-world economics of decision-making
problems are not captured by the theory of expected value. In the history of
economic literature, St. Petersburg Paradox has been a key factor in the devel-
opment of the utility function theories among many other ideas that were born
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from its resolution attempts. Over the years, the question regarding a general
utility function that captures arbitrary payoff functions has gained attention in
a wide range of scientific and industrial fields and has been addressed by many
experts. In his analysis of the financial and economic aspects of St. Petersburg
Paradox Libor (2011) states that by using the analysis and applications of this
paradox we may could have avoided some catastrophic financial situations. Ana-
lyzing high-tech stocks Sze´kely and Richards (2004) came to the same conclusion
regarding the run-up in stock prices in the late 1990s and the subsequent declines
in 2000.
Over the years, most of the solutions and attempts to explain the paradox
have dealt with definitions of subjective utility function and manipulations of the
utility function to fit the real world observed behavior (Bernoulli (1738); Weber
(1834); Fechner (1860); Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947); Von Neumann
et al. (2007)). Bounded utility function, bounded time or bounded number of
coin flips assumption remain the most favored explanations of the paradox to
date (Menger (1934); Samuelson (1977); Menger (1979); Arrow (1970); Aumann
(1977); Seidl (2013)).
In this paper, we take several perspectives on the paradox, including the cost-
benefit and time perspective. We start with an analysis of the paradox and
present the solution attempts and the theories of expected utility that were de-
veloped from the resolution attempts. We define the notion of net utility and
define a break-even point as a reference point for net utility inference. We con-
tinue with a definition of investment (or game) position and discuss the net
utility of changing the position of investment and show how the reference point
of break-even point along with the net utility notion allows us to capture the
utility of alternative positions in the game. We then define a dynamic reference
point and present an incremental net utility evaluation procedure to evaluate
the alternative game positions. This allows us to present several new properties
in the structure of the problem defined in the St. Petersburg Paradox and to
establish the equilibrium position that maximizes the utility while preserving
the invested resources. We formulate the Theorem of Indifference concerning
the expected utility payoff. This allows us to discuss the opportunity cost and
the time factor in investment (and St. Petersburg Paradox game). Incorporating
time factor, the objective in the evaluation of the game becomes maximizing the
expected net utility while minimizing the time invested in creating a net utility.
We treat time as a resource and extend our observations to a general set of re-
sources, establishing resources based criteria for tie-breaking points where there
is indifference concerning the expected value of the game.
Finally, we present the universal theory of net utility and show the role of
net utility in a rational decision-making process and how the value of net utility
allows for a more informed decision-making process. We present two necessary
conditions that the utility function has to conform to avoid the St. Petersburg
Paradox. The first condition is the boundness of the utility function. The sec-
ond condition concerns the net utility polarity, i.e., the net change of the utility
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value that is achieved due to the decision-making process. The net utility po-
larity of a decision process must be positive, relative to the starting point of
the decision process. The relation point is the break-even position, where the
most basic break-even position in any investment is the decision not to buy in,
i.e., doing nothing. Combining these necessary conditions allows us to define the
theorem of indifference and to present the role of the relative net utility in a
value rational decision-making process. By the term value rational, we refer to
a decision-making process with net positive polarity, that is, a total net positive
utility change. We conclude with the applications of our observation from St.
Petersburg Paradox and net utility in artificial intelligence (AI) and Economic
systems and point out some future research directions.
2. SAINT PETERSBURG PARADOX
We begin by presenting a table summarizing the details of the game in Table I.
In Table I each row shows the number of coin tosses until Paul gets ’heads’ for the
first time and the game ends. The first column in table I represents the number,
k, of coin tosses. The second column represents the probability of getting ’heads’
on k coin toss. The third column represents the reward derived from getting
’heads’ on k toss. The fourth column represents the expected payoff from getting
’heads’ on k toss, which is calculated by multiplying the probability of getting
”heads” on k toss with the respective value of the obtained reward.
k (num of throws) P (k) = 1
2k
Prize Expected Payoff
1 1
2
1 1
2
2 1
4
2 1
2
3 1
8
4 1
2
4 1
16
8 1
2
5 1
32
16 1
2
6 1
64
32 1
2
7 1
128
64 1
2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE I
Illustration of the St. Petersburg Paradox game in terms of number of tosses (k),
the probability to get ’heads’ on toss k, the respective prize, and the respective
expected payoff value.
The mathematical value of a fair price for playing the game is the accumulation
of expected payoffs,
1
2
+
1
2
+
1
2
+
1
2
.... =∞.
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This implies that a player will be willing to pay any price, up to infinity, to
participate in the game. However, most of the agents will pay a small amount of
money to participate in the game, contradicting the prediction of the expected
value theory. This is the paradox. While most of the literature talks about the
paradox of the infinite value of the game, there is an additional paradox which
has been ignored. The minimum win if one chooses to participate in this game
is 1 ducat even though utility theory expects a win of a half a ducat. This is
because the definition of expected utility is a first-order approximation of the real
utility. This can be viewed as the first-order components of a Taylor expansion
of the real utility.
The failure of the expected value theory to predict the real economic value of
the game has attracted many researchers over the years and served an important
role in the development of economic theories. A survey of the history of ideas,
theoretical and empirical, to explain and solve the paradox was conducted by
Samuelson (1977); Neugebauer et al. (2010); Seidl (2013); Cox et al. (2019). The
explanations of this well established challenge of the expected utility theory con-
centrated on diminishing marginal utility function, treating small probabilities
as zero, the boundness of utility function, time boundness or a bounded number
of flip coins.
The utility function concept was first introduced by Bernoulli (1738/1954) to
represent the subjective value of winnings and is also referred to as the moral
value or the moral hope by Gabrial Cremer in Bernoulli’s paper. Gabriel Cre-
mer and Daniel Bernoulli explained the paradox by decreasing marginal utility
and suggested concave transformation to solve the paradox. Cremer suggested
a square root of the original utility function and Bernoulli suggested a natural
logarithm. The subjectivity assumption was experimentally confirmed Weber
(1834); Fechner (1860) and formalized in the Expected Utility model Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1947); Von Neumann et al. (2007). Some experimental
works showed that the concepts of marginal utility and perception of small prob-
abilities as zero cannot explain the paradox but support Bernoulli’s observations
of risk-aversion tendency in decision-making Cox et al. (2011); Neugebauer et al.
(2010); Cox et al. (2019). Bounded utility function or bounded number of coin
flips assumption remains the most favored explanation of the paradox to date.
Menger (1934) work on the St. Petersburg Paradox showed that the marginal
diminishing utility transformation is not sufficient since the rewards can increase
faster than the rate at which the utility diminishes. This observation led to the
conclusion that boundedness of the utility function or coin flips is a necessary
condition to prevent the occurrence of a St. Petersburg Paradox Menger (1934,
1979); Arrow (1970); Aumann (1977); Seidl (2013). The time boundedness as-
sumption Brito (1975); Aumann (1977); Cowen and High (1988) suggests that
limited time will bind the utility function. Even infinite rewards will create finite
utility with the natural bound of individual life. In this paper, in the context of
boundedness in the St. Petersburg paradox, we discuss the basic bounds of the
budget and time of the player and provide a framework to trace and set bounds
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on the net utility change between alternative game scenarios, i.e., the bounded-
ness of the incremental change in net utility rather than the boundedness of the
utility function outcomes.
Non-Expected Utility theories were developed due to the paradox in the ex-
pected utility theory, and these include: the dual theory of choice under risk Yaari
(1987), prospect theory Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the cumulative
prospect theory Tversky and Kahneman (1992). These theories do not address
the St. Petersburg Paradox, however, they provide several important observa-
tions that can be leveraged to solve the paradox.
The concept of a reference point and relative utility is observed in the prospect
theory. Prospect theory assumes the existence of a reference point for the per-
ception of decisions outcomes as losses or gains. Recent work by Werner and
Zank (2019) provides a survey on models with reference points and suggests a
model to reveal a reference point in the prospect theory. In the next section, we
leverage prospect theory observations on the reference point and relative utility
to build a framework to reveal dynamic reference points for net utility change
of game positions in the St. Petersburg Paradox, which we exploit to choose
a policy and evaluate the game. The theoretic contribution of this paper sug-
gests an explanation for the experimental observations in the expected utility
theory and behavioral economics on reference points and relative utility as well
as risk-aversion and diminishing marginal utility.
2.1. Petersburg Game decision-making Process Diagram
Representation of the game as in Table I is common in most discussions about
St. Petersburg Paradox, although it is missing a few important details regarding
the decision-making process of participating in the game and the evaluation
of possible scenarios in the game. In what follows we take a deeper look at
the decision-making process in the St. Petersburg Paradox game and provide a
diagram to illustrate it.
Figure 1 illustrates an event-decision diagram of a single St. Petersburg para-
dox game that Peter suggests to Paul. The diagram represents the game scenar-
ios and the decision process that Paul has to go through in the game that Peter
suggests. Generally speaking, the process constitutes the states in the game, one
decision, and one deterministic action followed by a sequence of stochastic events.
The process starts from an initial state as illustrated with a rectangle and rep-
resents the position before the game starts. A decision state is illustrated with a
rhombus and represents Paul’s decision of whether to participate in the game or
not. An action state is illustrated with a circle and represents the action of Paul’s
payment to Peter in case he decides to participate in the game. A sequence of
stochastic events illustrated with dashed circles represents the sequence of tosses
until the coin lands on ’heads’.
The game as illustrated in Figure 1 can be analyzed from different time, value
and budget perspectives. In what follows we will cover some of the main per-
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Figure 1.— An Illustration of a single game as described in St. Petersburg
Paradox. The game illustrated with a decision-event diagram on a scale of time,
budget, expected value and expected total budget associated with achievable
positions in the game.
spectives used to analyze the game and to estimate the expected value of the
game.
We now take a closer look at the different game scenarios in St. Petersburg
Paradox which is represented by the diagram in Figure 1. Paul’s budget at the
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initial state of the game is B = b ducats. Peter suggests that Paul participate in
the game which leaves Paul with two choices: If Paul declines Peter’s offer, he
stays in his initial position with the initial budget of b ducat. If he accepts Peter’s
offer, he has to pay c ducats to participate in the game. Once Paul decides to
buy into the game, the decision phase is done, the action of paying for the game
is applied and the reward is determined according to the outcome of a sequence
of stochastic events. By stochastic events, we refer to the sequence of coin tosses
until the coin lands on ’heads’.
Given the terms of the game, Paul can calculate the expected brake-even
point for the amount of money c that was paid to participate in the game, within
his budget restrictions c < B, that he is willing and able to pay to participate.
Based on the fact that only one scenario of events from the presented scenarios
can occur in one game, Paul chooses his expected position from different prospec-
tive scenarios, i.e., his payoff expectation for brake-even or an improved position
from participation in the game. As illustrated in this example, the expected value
of each scenario of sequence of tosses that ends with ’heads’ is 12 which can be
calculated by the multiplication of scenario probability and the related prize as
illustrated in Table I. Hence for each sequence of tosses that ends with ’heads’
the break-even expected value is 12 . This is without taking the cost of time into
account. Taking into account the invested time in the game (which can be repre-
sented as a monetary value through lost alternatives of investments also referred
to as the opportunity cost), we can formulate a decreasing utility function. The
rate of the decrease is dependent on the alternative investments. Paul is aware
of his evaluation methods of alternative investments (or opportunities).
3. NET UTILITY AND ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
3.1. Evaluation with Respect to Break-Even Point
To put it simply, the break-even point is where the costs we pay for partici-
pating in the game is equal to the benefits that are derived from participating
in the game. The first and the most basic break-even point in the game is the
initial state which is achieved with the decision of not participating in the game.
3.2. The Decision-Choice of Not Participating in the Game
The decision to do nothing, depicted in decision nodes ’Buy In’ in the game
diagram in Figure 1, is always implicitly available. To evaluate the alternatives
and the expected outcomes of the game, we set the decision-choice of doing noth-
ing, i.e. not participating in the game, as the first and the most basic reference
point.
The reference point of ’doing nothing’ will allow us to define the break-even
point of the game. When we take into account the costs of participating in the
game and the budget of the participant, the reference point of ’doing nothing’ is
a break-even point. We define the break-even point as follow.
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Definition 3.1 Given a sequence of events e0, e1, e2 . . . ek a cost function c(ei)
and a value function u(ei) for each i ≤ k the break even point of the game BEP
occurs when
∑k
i=1 u(ei) =
∑k
i=1 c(ei).
We define the break-even as the utility achieved in the last event (heads on
a coin toss) of a sequence of events. The cost, however, is paid at the initial
point of the sequence of events with the decision to participate in the game. The
expected payoff depends on both ”tails” and ”heads”. The number of ”tails”
determines the payoff whereas the ”heads” is a critical indicator of when the
game is stopped and the payoff effected.
k (num of throws) P (k) = 1
2k
Prize Expected Payoff
Init/Fold – 0 0
1 1
2
1 1
2
2 1
4
2 1
2
3 1
8
4 1
2
4 1
16
8 1
2
5 1
32
16 1
2
6 1
64
32 1
2
7 1
128
64 1
2
. . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE II
Illustration of the St. Petersburg Paradox game as in Table I with the initial
position description added, colored in gray, which describes additionally the ’init’
state and the decision of not participating the game.
Table II extends Table I with the details of the initial position at the initial
state, which is depicted in nodes ’init’ in the game diagram in Figure 1. The
additional row ’Init/Fold’ in Table II represents the pre-decision state where
there is no reward and no costs paid to participate in the game. It also represents
the decision ”Fold”, that is the decision not to participate in the game in which
case the reward, as well as the expected payoff, are 0.
3.3. Net Utility of Changing Position
In what follows we present an incremental evaluation approach to find the
optimal position in the Saint Petersburg Paradox game.
Using the Oxford dictionary definition Dictionary (2008) we define a Game
Position as follows:
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Definition 3.2 A Game Position is:
• A person’s point of view or attitude towards the game payoff
• The extent to which an investor, dealer, or speculator has made a commit-
ment in the market by buying or selling securities.
Definition 3.3 Given a set of game positions p0, p1...pk..., the utility of game
position pk in the St. Petersburg Paradox, u(pk) is the expected payoff of a game
with k coin flips.
k (num of throws) P (k) = 1
2k
Prize Expected Payoff Net Utility
Fold – – 0 0
1 1
2
1 1
2
1
2
2 1
4
2 1
2
1
2
3 1
8
4 1
2
1
2
4 1
16
8 1
2
1
2
5 1
32
16 1
2
1
2
6 1
64
32 1
2
1
2
7 1
128
64 1
2
1
2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE III
Illustration of the St. Petersburg Paradox game with the initial position details
(colored in gray row) and a ”Net Utility” with respect to initial position
(colored in gray column).
Our initial reference point is the break-even point in the initial state with
the value of 0 (no costs nor benefit produced in the game). Having an initial
reference point, we can evaluate other applicable positions of Paul in the game
with respect to the initial break-even point.
We define the net utility of game position with respect to a reference point
point as follows.
Definition 3.4 Given a set of game positions p0, p1...pk..., the net utility of
game position pk with respect to a reference position pi is the net change in the
expected payoff, i.e., u(pk)− u(pi).
Assuming the initial position with u(p0) = 0 we have a special case where the
utility of game position pk is also the net change in the expected payoff from the
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initial position where i = 0 and equals, u(pk). However, in most of the real-world
scenarios, we cannot assume that zero utility for the state in which we consider
an investment or gamble decision. Hence, we can not assume that considering
the utility of an arbitrary game position will reflect the real impact of obtaining
it. In what follows, we show how the informativeness of the notion of net utility
allows us to capture a broader context of the impact of a decision’s possible
achievements.
Table III extends Table II with the details of the net utility of changing position
with respect to the initial state. As Table III shows, in terms of the net utility
with respect to our initial position, there is indifference with regard to each
position with k > 0.
3.4. Dynamic Reference Point for Net Utility of Changing Position
Having an initial reference point, we can evaluate other applicable positions of
Paul in the game and update the reference point dynamically when a reference
point with better utility is found.
k (num of throws) P (k) = 1
2k
Prize Expected Payoff Net Utility Relative Net Utility
Fold – – 0 0 0
1 1
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
2 1
4
2 1
2
1
2
0
3 1
8
4 1
2
1
2
0
4 1
16
8 1
2
1
2
0
5 1
32
16 1
2
1
2
0
6 1
64
32 1
2
1
2
0
7 1
128
64 1
2
1
2
0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE IV
Illustration of the St. Petersburg Paradox game with the initial position details
(colored in gray row) and a ”Relative (dynamic) Net Utility” with respect to best
position found so far (colored in gray column). Highlighted in yellow is the first
(and last) beneficial changing position decision
Table IV extends Table III with the details of the net utility of changing
position with respect to the best position found so far. Figure 2 depicts a pseudo-
code of an incremental net utility evaluation with dynamic reference point which
puts into practice our observations on the net utility change in the St. Petersburg
Paradox.
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Incremental-Net-Utility-Evaluation
RefPos := 0 // Initialize Reference Position
CurrPos := 0 // Initialize Current Position
NUC := 0 // Initialize Net Utility Change
NUC∗ := 0 // Initialize Best Net Utility Change so far
loop:
CurrPos = CurrPos + 1
NUC = EU(CurrPos) − EU(RefPos) // Calculate Expected Net Utility Change
if NUC > NUC∗:
NUC∗ = NUC
RefPos = CurrPos
if Termination-criteria:
return NUC∗, RefPos
Figure 2.— Incremental net utility evaluation with dynamic reference point
update
In the next section, we present the Theorem of Indifference and resource pre-
serving tie-breaking decision criteria which allows us to define the termination
criteria for the incremental net utility evaluation procedure. The Theorem of In-
difference will allow us to find the equilibrium in effective. The net utility change
and the resource preserving tie-breaking decision criteria will allow us to define
an efficient evaluation termination within the equilibrium zone.
4. THEOREM OF INDIFFERENCE AND RESOURCE PRESERVING TIE-BREAKING
DECISION CRITERIA
In the St. Petersburg game, we pursue an optimal position to improve the
net utility. Table IV shows that the increase in the number of coin flips (the
incremental change in game position) after the initial coin flip, results in no
change in the expected utility, with respect to the reference point. Although the
Payoff might be increasing with the increased number of coin flips, the probability
of achieving the payoff is decreasing at a rate that preserves the same expected
utility for each game position. This results in the increase of risk in the game,
respective to the number of flip coins (i.e. the respective game positions) without
the justification of improved expected utility. We now examine how to find a
game position that achieves equilibrium in the game which preserves resources
without damaging the potential expected utility. Note that in what follows we
optimize the evaluation process of choosing Paul’s game position and by doing
that we find the resource preserving position among equally attractive positions
in terms of the expected utility1.
The evaluation process of choosing a position in the game that is described in
Figure 2 consists of the evaluation actions of incremental change and evaluation
1This can be seen as a process of planning a solution, i.e. planning a decision in the case of
the St. Petersburg Paradox
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of game positions. Treating the evaluation process as a sequential action appli-
cation allows us to adopt action planning methods. Theorem 4.1 was suggested
by Muller and Karpas (2018) to solve problems of sequential action planning in
which the objective is to choose a sequence of actions to maximize agent utility
under budget restrictions. It allows us to optimize a sequence of actions that lead
to effective net positive change in the utility by truncating actions that exploit
resources (such as time) and do not lead to the net positive utility value change.
This will allow us to define efficient termination criteria for the incremental net
utility evaluation procedure (Figure 2). Put simply, the Theorem states that; for
each sequence of actions pi, there is a sub-sequence pi′ that; (i) ends with a net
positive utility value action (net utility of the action of changing game position
in the St. Petersburg Paradox), (ii) is at most as costly as pi, and (iii) is at least
as valuable as pi.
Theorem 4.1 (Theorem of Indifference) Given a game Π with an additive
utility function u, for any policy pi for Π such that u(sJpiK) > u(s0), there is a
prefix pi′ of pi such that:
1. u(s0JpiK) ≤ u(s0Jpi′K), and
2. for the last action alast along pi
′, we have u(alast) > 0.
Proof: The proof is by induction on the plan length n. For n = 1, we have
pi = 〈a1〉, and since u(sJpiK) > u(s0), the action a1 has a positive net utility value.
Hence, pi′ = pi satisfies the claims. Assuming that the claim holds for n ≥ 1, we
now prove it for n+ 1.
Considering a plan pi = 〈a1, . . . , an+1〉, for i ∈ [n + 1], let pii denote the
prefix of pi consisting of its first i actions. If the last action an+1 along pi has
a positive net utility value, then we are done with pi′ = pi. Otherwise, if an+1
has either negative or zero net utility value, then u(sJpiK) > u(s0) in particular
implies u(sJpinK) > u(s0). If pi′ is a prefix of pin that satisfies the lemma by our
assumption of induction, then pi′ also satisfies the lemma with respect to pi since
u(pi′) ≥ u(sJpinK) ≥ u(sJpiK). Q.E.D.
4.1. Tie-Breaking Decision Criteria
Although the expected utility is the same for all alternatives when choosing
positions in the game, it would be wrong to state that a rational player would
play infinite games. In terms of the expected value, there is no benefit to changing
position in the game, i.e., the net utility from changing position from one toss,
is zero. At the same time, the implicit costs can be enormous in terms of time.
These costs in terms of time mean that changing position from one toss to
any other position is not optimal. In summary, by logical principles, a rational
choice among equal opportunities will optimize the cost of time invested in each
opportunity.
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4.2. Utility Tie Braking with Time Factor
As Table III shows, there is indifference in the dimension of the benefit among
the alternatives that Paul can choose from. In such a case, Paul can choose a
random position or find a tie-breaking criterion that is measured in different di-
mensions, for instance, the dimension of time. Given two alternatives of optional
St. Petersburg games, game A and B, with equal expected utility, u(A) = u(B),
a rational player will choose the game that optimizes the factor of time.
We assume that each toss has a time duration and we annotate the duration
of a single toss with . Given a St. Petersburg game A that constitutes of k
tosses, with k > 0, the duration of game A is k. In a St. Petersburg game B
that consists of i tosses where i < k, the duration of game B is i and i < k.
Suppose that in terms of utility there is indifference between game A and B, i.e.,
u(A) = u(B). In terms of time, it is straight-forward that game B is preferable.
Since in terms of the cost of time, game B is preferable to game B, a rational
player that both maximizes the utility and optimizes the time will choose game
B which is time preserving.
We now extend the tie breaking point to a set of game alternatives. Let a set
STP = X1, X2, X3....Xk
be a set of St. Petersburg games with respective expected utilities of
u(X1), u(X2), u(X3)...u(Xk)
and respective time duration
t(X1), t(X2), t(X3)....t(Xk).
Let the expected utility of each two games in the set be equal, i.e for each
Xi, Xj ∈ STP holds u(Xi) = u(Xj). Suppose
t(X1) < t(X2) < t(X3).... < t(Xk)
a rational player will pursue the game X1 which optimizes the time required to
achieve the expected utility. In other words, among equally attractive games in
terms of the expected utility, a rational player will pursue the time-preserving
alternative which is the least number of tosses.
4.3. From Time to Resource-Based Utility Tie Breaking Point
The tie-breaking point that is based on the time factor can be easily extended
to a general case of resource-consuming actions or games. We treat time as a
resource when we define the tie-breaking point and pursue the resource preserving
scenario among scenarios with equal net utility change. The logic of preserving
time or any other resource is the same.
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5. THE NET UTILITY IN (BOUNDED) RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
In this section, we define and discuss the necessary conditions for a value
rational decision-making process. By the term value rational, we refer to a
decision-making process with net positive utility polarity, that is, a total net
positive utility change. We start with a review of the rational and bounded ra-
tional decision-making process. We then present two necessary conditions that
the utility function has to conform to avoid the St. Petersburg Paradox. The
first condition is the boundness of the utility function. The second condition
concerns the net utility polarity, i.e., the net change of the utility value that
is achieved as a result of the decision-making process outcome. The net utility
polarity of a decision-making process must be positive relative to the starting
position. The relation point is the break-even position, where the most basic
break-even position in any investment is the decision not to ”buy in”, i.e., doing
nothing. Combining these necessary conditions allows us to define the theorem of
indifference (4.1) and to present the role of the relative net utility in a rational,
sequential rational decision-making process.
5.1. Value Rational and Bounded Rational decision-making Process
Problem solving, planning, and decision-making processes constitute ordered
decision choices and decision actions Kriger and Barnes (1992); Marwala (2015).
Instantaneous decision-choices are the atomic units that compose a decision’s
action. An optimized decision results in a global maximization of utility DeG-
root (2005); Berger (2013). Decision actions can be rational or irrational .
Following the work of Marwala (2015), we define the decision action as ratio-
nal if it results in a globally optimum outcome, based on logical principles and
derived from complete and relevant information. A decision based on irrelevant
or incomplete information is irrational, and cannot lead to a global optimum
solution. A rational decision-making process comprises of rational decision ac-
tions, and the entire process is optimized in time and results in a global utility
optimum Gru¨ne-Yanoff (2012); Marwala (2014, 2015). The quantification of the
extent of this irrationality is what is called bounded rationality.
The concept of bounded rationality Simon (1957, 1990, 1991) explains ir-
rational decision-making based on incomplete data analysis which leads to in-
complete information for making a decision. The concept of Flexible-bounded
rationality is based on the fact that advancements in AI and machine data
analysis make the bounds of rationality flexible (Marwala (2013)).
The rational decision-making process constitutes a sequential (inter-related)
application of rational decision actions. Rationality is not dividable Marwala
(2013), a process of applying a sequence of depended decision actions cannot be
partly rational and partly irrational. Even one irrational action makes the entire
decision-making process irrational and compromises the attainment of a globally
optimal solution. The imperfection of information in a single decision action
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leads an entire decision-making process to be irrational with a sub-optimal end,
in time or utility. Advanced information analysis methods can assist in repairing
(partially) the imperfection of information to lead to a (partial) rationalization
of a decision-making process.
We now present two conditions that the utility function must conform to in
order to allow for a value rational decision-making process.
5.2. The Boundness of Utility Function
Bassett Jr (1987); Samuelson (1977) provides a detailed historical review on
the boundness of utility conditions. The first researcher to observe the necessity
of bounded utility function to avoid the paradox was Menger (1934). Menger’s
observations were later extended and proven by Arrow (1970). The paradox was
extensively investigated in the work of Menger (1934)2, which among other things
devised the Menger theorem, which can be described as follows.
Theorem 5.1 A path has a finite price with the use of utility function f(x) for
any sequence of possible payoffs 〈a1, . . . , an. . . . 〉 when and only when function
f(x) is limited.
Arrow (1970) proves the utility boundness theorem.
Theorem 5.2 (Utility Boundness Theorem) Any utility function which satisfies
the conditions of the Expected Utility Theorem must be bounded from above and
below.
The Expected Utility Theorem Arrow (1970); Samuelson (1977); Bassett Jr
(1987) provides a condition for preference among two actions.
Theorem 5.3 (Expected Utility Theorem) It is possible to define a real-valued
utility function over actions [or decisions with their implied respective possible
outcomes, each with specifiable probabilities], with the following properties:
1. a1 > −a2 [i.e., action 1 definitely preferred to action 2] if and only if
u(a1) > u(a2)
2. u(a) = E[u(aJsK)] [i.e., equals the expected value of utilities of outcomes
implied by action a].
Assuming state s1 to be the original state, the expected utility of action action
is the expected utility value of the target state s2, i.e., the utility of the state that
is achieved after the application of an action a. In simple terms, a1 is preferable
to a2 if the expected value of utilities of outcomes of the application of a1 in state
s, E[u(a1JsK)], are greater than the application of a2 in state s, E[u(a2JsK)].
2the paper translated to English in Menger (1979)
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Note that the expected utility theorem takes into account of the utility of the
target state, u(s2), but not the utility of the original state u(s1). The theorem
captures a process of strictly positive net utility action (or decision) application.
That is, each action applied necessarily improves the state in which it is applied.
However, most real-world decision-making processes, and in particular, sequen-
tial decision-making processes, involve the application of actions or sequences of
actions of negative utility polarity. Such actions may worsen/decrease the utility
of the state in which it is applied 3. In such a case, the theorem provides a rec-
ommendation of preferring actions over other actions, although they both might
be negative in total net terms.
Let us consider the following example to stress this point. Consider an original
state s1 with two actions a1 and a2 applicable in state s1;
1. u(a1) = E[u(a1Js1K)] = E[u(s2)] = 100
2. u(a2) = E[u(a2Js1K)] = E[u(s3)] = 150
The expected value of utility outcomes of applying action a2 are greater than
those of applying a1. Using the theorem of expected utility, we will choose to
apply action a2 to achieve a greater utility outcome. It should be noted, to that
end, that a piece of available information which is essential for the decision-
making process is neglected. The utility of the original state is not incorporated
in the preference system that is implied by the theorem of expected utility.
Now let us consider the utility of the original state s1 and incorporate it
into our preferences system. We are interested in the net utility polarity in our
example and consider several different utility values for the original state s1 as
follows:
1. u(s1) = 75
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)] = 100 > u(s1)
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)] = 150 > u(s1)
2. u(s1) = 100
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)] = 100 = u(s1)
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)] = 150 > u(s1)
3. u(s1) = 125
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)] = 100 < u(s1)
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)] = 150 > u(s1)
4. u(s1) = 150
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)] = 100 < u(s1)
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)] = 150 = u(s1)
5. u(s1) = 175
3the discussion is about negative utility, not the costs of actions that can be seen as invest-
ments
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(a) E[u(a1Js1K)] = 100 < u(s1)
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)] = 150 < u(s1)
When the focus is on the outcome of actions, we can compare action a1 to a2
in terms of their outcomes, but we miss the impact of the action, which is easily
captured using the net utility terms. It is straightforward that a2 is preferable to
a1. However, are we asking the right question? Our simple example shows that
although the outcome of a2 is greater than the outcome of a1, in relative net
change terms, it does not imply that we should apply any of them since keeping
the current position and doing nothing, results in a better outcome than doing
something. The theorem of indifference (4.1) captures exactly that phenomena in
sequential scenarios as a decision-making process, sequential action application,
and sequence of events. The theorem exploits the polarity of the net change
in sequential scenarios as the bound for the utility function to avoid the St.
Petersburg Paradox. In the next section, we take a closer look at the net utility
polarity role in the rational decision-making process and reformulate the theorem
of expected utility to the theorem on expected net utility.
5.3. Net Utility Polarity in Value Rational decision-making Process
Value rational decision-making process (or game/investment) has net positive
utility polarity, i.e., it leads to total net positive change. In particular, the last
decision (or position/event) of any value rational decision-making process has to
be of net positive polarity.
Based on Theorem 5.3, we define the expected net utility theorem as follows:
The expected net utility theorem is defined in terms of total change of utility
rather than the outcomes solely as in Theorem 5.3. In practice, we define the
utility of action as the difference between the action’s precondition state and
the outcomes of the action, rather than the action’s outcomes solely. Evaluation
of utility function in terms of expected net utility theorem provides a more
informative picture of the real impact of the utility function of actions/decisions.
The real impact of an action is not fully captured in the outcomes of actions and
can vary concerning the utility of the state in which the action is applied.
Theorem 5.4 (The Expected Net Utility Theorem) Given a state spre and
an action a applicable in state spre, seff is the state that is obtained with an
application of action a. It is possible to define a real-valued utility function over
actions [or decisions with their implied respective possible outcomes, each with
specifiable probabilities], with the following properties:
1. a1 > −a2 [i.e., action 1 definitely preferred to action 2] if and only if
u(a1) > u(a2)
2. u(a) = E[u(aJsK) − u(s)] [i.e., equals the expected value of the total net
change of utilities implied by action a].
3. for an action a, the net utility of a is u(a) =
∑
v∈V(eff(a))[u(eff(a)[v]) −
u(pre(a)[v])].
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The Expected Net Utility Theorem is more informative since it exploits the
utility information compactly and allows us effectively (and efficiently) to put
this information into practice, i.e., to conduct a more informative preference
system. A preference system that based on the Expected Net Utility Theorem
takes into account the net utility polarity of actions, allows us to compare the
outcomes actions as well as the total net change achieved by the actions. The
following example shows the informativeness of a preference system based on
net utility. In some cases, actions with positive outcomes might bring negative
utility in net terms.
1. u(s1) = 75
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)− u(s1)] = 25
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)− u(s1)] = 75
2. u(s1) = 100
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)− u(s1)] = 0
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)− u(s1)] = 50
3. u(s1) = 125
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)− u(s1)] = −25
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)− u(s1)] = 25
4. u(s1) = 150
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)− u(s1)] = −50
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)− u(s1)] = 0
5. u(s1) = 175
(a) E[u(a1Js1K)− u(s1)] = −75
(b) E[u(a2Js1K)− u(s1)] = −25
5.4. The Theorem of Indifference in Value Rational decision-making Process
Combining the boundness (Section 5.3) and the net utility polarity (Section
5.2) conditions for utility function, we formulated the theorem of indifference
(Theorem 4.1) that recognizes the suffix of a sequence of events, decisions, or
changes of position that do not bring positive change (that is, they are not of
net positive polarity). The theorem of indifference combines the two conditions
over the utility function in a sequential decision-making process in a sequential
game/investment. It puts it into practice in the algorithm of incremental utility
improvement evaluation provided in Figure 2.
6. THE UNIVERSAL CONCEPT OF NET UTILITY
In 1901 Planck (1901) published a paper that explained the black body ra-
diation problem by assuming that energy is in the form of little packets called
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quanta. In 1905 Einstein (1905) published a paper that explained the photo-
electric effect using the concept of quanta that was proposed by Max Planck.
Because the theory of quanta was able to explain two different phenomena, it
was assumed to be a universal theory of nature. The concept of quanta that
proposed the packaging of energy gave rise to the theory of quantum mechan-
ics. The manner in which we solved the St. Petersburg Paradox is through the
use of the concept of the net utility. The same concept of the net utility was
used in behavioral economics by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In prospect
theory, the importance of relative utility is observed additionally to the absolute
utility. The concept of net utility is useful in different disciplines, prescriptive
economics (e.g., the St. Petersburg Paradox) and descriptive economics (e.g.,
behavioral economics). Hence, the net utility should be used as a universal con-
cept of understanding economics in the same way as the theory of energy quanta
was assumed to be a universal theory when it explained both the black body
radiation problem and the photoelectric effect. In classical economics, we define
a rational agent as an agent that maximizes its utility. In light of the univer-
sal concept of utility, this is the wrong approach to defining a rational agent.
We define a rational agent as an agent that maximizes its net utility. With this
definition on maximizing the net utility one is able to explain the behavior of
people as it is done in the prospect theory. Secondly, one is able to explain the
St. Petersburg Paradox.
7. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed the use of the concept of the net utility to successfully
explain the St. Petersburg problem. The concept of net utility or relative utility
was experimentally observed by Kahneman and Tvesrky and has had a profound
impact in the field of behavioral economics. This paper furthermore concludes
that the net utility concept more universally explains value than the nominal
utility.
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